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 Abstract. Aggregate demand models extending IS/LM fixed price framework yield 
an enhancement mechanism of the traditional monetary transmission mechanism, 
the credit channel, which, according to the credit view, works through the ‘balance 
sheet channel’ and the ‘bank lending channel’. In this paper I modify the augmented 
IS/LM model assuming that investments may be financed by both internal and 
external sources of funds. The inclusion of internal funds in the augmented IS/LM 
fixed price model suggests a different interpretation of the ‘balance sheet channel’ 
as an enhancement mechanism amplifying monetary policy effects through the 
quantity rather than the cost of borrowing. Thus, changes in borrowers’ net worth 
over the cycle can amplify and propagate output fluctuations directly rather than 
indirectly as in the traditional interpretation of the balance sheet channel. The 
empirical analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism for Italy in the last 
decade accords with the interpretation of the balance sheet channel proposed in this 
paper. 
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1. Introduction 
For many years economists, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, 
ignored the role of credit market in determining real economic activity. The recent 
literature examining the consequences of asymmetric information in financial 
markets stresses that, contrary to the financial irrelevance proposition of the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem, financial conditions matters for investment decisions 
(Messori, 1996, Stiglitz, 1988, 2000). Indeed, as capital market imperfections make 
external funds available at a higher cost than the internal ones, a financing hierarchy 
is likely to emerge and firms may be financially constrained in their investment 
decisions, i.e. they may postpone or forsake positive net present value investment 
projects (Kaplan and Zingales, 1995). 
Empirical works, both at aggregate and individual level, tend to confirm the 
influence of financial factors on corporate investment decisions in many countries. 
Several studies considering aggregate corporate financing patterns find some 
regularities, both at single country level and in international comparisons, indicating 
that retentions are the dominant source of fund and that bank loans are the main 
source of external finance (Mayer, 1988, 1990, Mac-Kie Mason, 1990, and Taggart 
Jr. 1990). Moreover, empirical estimates of investments equation using q models 
find that the inclusion of cash-flow variables significantly improves the performance 
of investments equation (Fazzari et al., 1988, Bond and Meghir, 1994, Hoshi et al., 
1991, among the others). 
Aggregate demand models extending IS/LM fixed price framework (Brunner and 
Meltzer, 1968, 1972, Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, 1992, Dale and Haldane, 1993a, 
1993b) relax the assumption of perfect substitutability between bank and non-bank 
sources of credit, both as banks' assets and as non-bank private sector's liabilities, 
providing an explicit role for the supply side of the credit market. These 
modification of the original framework yield an enhancement mechanism of the 
traditional monetary transmission mechanism, the credit channel, which, according 
to the credit view, works through the balance sheet channel and the bank lending 
channel. In the credit view of the monetary transmission mechanism the first channel 
stresses the impact of monetary policy on borrowers’ financial position (net worth, 
cash flow and liquid assets) on the size of the external finance premium and then on 
investment spending, while the latter stresses the possibility that monetary policy 
may affect the supply of intermediated credit, particularly bank loans. 
In this paper I modify the augmented IS/LM model assuming that investments 
may be financed by both internal and external sources of funds. The inclusion of 
internal funds in the augmented IS/LM fixed price model suggests a different 
interpretation of the balance sheet channel as an enhancement mechanism which 
amplify interest rates effects working through the quantity rather than the cost of 
borrowing. In this sense, borrowers’ availability of internally generated funds which   3 
may be directly used for financing investment projects may give rise to a higher 
monetary policy effectiveness as the result of the reduction of the financial 
constraints on firms’ investment behaviour. Moreover, with this interpretation of the 
balance sheet channel, movements in borrowers’ balance sheet will amplify and 
propagate business cycles fluctuations directly and not indirectly, as usually stated 
by the ‘financial accelerator’ effect working through banks’ behaviour. Such an 
interpretation of the balance sheet channel seems more in line with the common 
practice in banking relationship with firms, where price discrimination depends on 
parameters like the existence of a long or short term relationship, firm’s size and/or 
firm’s business volume with the bank. 
2. The model (an augmented IS/LM fixed price model 
with internal funds) 
The augmented IS/LM framework is defined over four markets, goods, money, 
credit and bonds, and two sectors, the non-bank private sector (nbps from now on) 
and commercial banks. The public sector is absent in this model as bonds are issued 
by the nbps and not by government. The balance-sheets of the two sectors are 
represented in Table 1. The nbps’ liabilities comprise their borrowings from the 
banking sector,  Ld, and their net issue of bonds,  Bs, which are balanced by their 
money holdings,  Md . The banking sector supplies loans to nbps,  Ls, and invests in 
bonds supplied by the nbps,  B
d , the reserves borrowed from the central bank, R. 
Table 1 - Sectoral balance sheets 
Non-bank  private sector  Bank 
assets liabilities  assets  liabilities 
M











Looking at sectoral balance sheets we note that the supply side of the credit 
market (loan supply) represents a bank asset, while its demand side (demand for 
bank loans) is a liability of the non-bank private sector. Banks' choice of asset 
composition between loans and bonds depends on portfolio considerations. Banks' 
loan supply depends positively on the interest rate on bank loans and negatively on 
the interest rate on bonds. Moreover, it depends positively on the level of reserves,   4 
Ls = Ls i, ρ,R ()      (1) 
where  Li
s < 0,  Lρ
s > 0,  LR
s > 0. 
On the other side firms' demand for investment gives the demand for bank loans. 
Investment demand is assumed to depend on both the cost of capital, negatively, and 
aggregate output, positively, as in the standard flexible accelerator model 
(Jorgenson, 1963). The nbps' demand for bank loans depends on considerations 
involving firms' investment and financing decisions. If the firm's optimal investment 
level is I, it may choose to finance it using retained earnings at the opportunity cost 
δ,1 bank loans at the interest rate ρ, and new bonds issue at the interest rate i. The 
relationship between firm's investment spending and its sources of funds is given by 
the following identity: 
I = IF + Ld + Bs      (2) 
where IF is the amount of internally generated funds available for investment 
spending. These funds are residual in nature, as they represent what remains to the 
firm after paying wages, w, and dividends, d. Given the fixed price framework of the 
augmented IS/LM framework and assuming the constancy of dividends through the 
time2, we may express retained earnings, IF, as 
IF = (1-a) y         (3) 
where a is (w + d) / y. Thus, if we consider equation (2) may be written as 
I − 1− a () y = IN = Ld + Bs            (4) 
where I
N represents investments out of retained earnings, that is firm's external 
financing needs.  
Assuming, as in Kashyap et al. (1993), that firms need external funds, each firm 
will choose to finance a fraction α of investment I
N with bank loans and a fraction 
(1-α) issuing bonds, and being α* firm's optimal financing mix between bank loans 
and bonds, the cost of capital for a firm will be given by a weighted sum of the cost 
of both external sources of funds (if we assume a cost opportunity for internal funds 
equal to zero): 
k = 1 −α* () i +α*ρ = i + ρ− i () α*    (5) 
                                                            
1 Given the absence of government bonds we set the opportunity cost of retained earnings 
equal to zero. 
2 The sticky dividend policies is assumed in the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984).   5 
where  α* = L
d
I
N =α i − ρ ()  is firm's optimal financing mix (with 
1−α* () = B
s
I
N  ). 
Firm's investment demand, as in the standard flexible accelerator model, 
(Jorgenson, 1963), is assumed to depend positively on aggregate output and 
negatively on the cost of capital 
I = Id y,k ()      (6) 
so that investment demand out of retained earnings is 
IN = Id y,k () − 1−a () y      (7) 
From the definition of α* and  IN  we may derive the demand for bank loans Ld 
as 
Ld = α*IN = Ld i,ρ,y ()      (8) 
where loan demand depends, via α*, negatively upon its own rate, ρ, and positively 
on the bond rate, i, i.e  Li
d > 0,  Lρ
d < 0. Moreover, as a change in aggregate income 
affects both investments demand and retained earnings in the same direction, the 
derivative of the demand for loans with respect to income, Ly
d, will be lower or equal 
to the one which characterises the augmented IS/LM model without internal funds. 
In particular, it will be lower if the effect of a change in aggregate income on the 
level of retained earnings will be positive; it will be equal if the effect of this change 
will be zero. 
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The effects of an increase in income on the demand for loans are presented in figure 
1. The demand for loans is measured on the horizontal axis by the difference 
between I* and IF (the figure refers to the case in which debt is the only external 
source of funds). An increase in income cause a shift to the right both of the Id curve 
and of the F curve, so that the final effect on the demand for loans may not be 
determined a priori as it will depend on the relative movements of the two curves. 
Anyway, the inclusion of internal funds among the sources available to firms  in 
financing investments let the derivative of the demand for loans with respect to 
income,  Ly
d, assume a lower (at limit even negative) value as regards the 
conventional augmented IS/LM model. 
 
Money market 
Absent  nbps’ cash holdings,  deposits equal money supply,  Dd = Ms, and 
reserves equal monetary base, R=B. Then, we define the money supply function with 
the usual money multiplier relationship: 
Ms = mR     (9) 
with m>0. 
Given the nbps' balance sheet condition shown in table 1 the specification of the 
nbps’ demand for money needs some explanations. Absent government bonds, nbps’ 
opportunity cost of money holdings is represented by the cost of borrowing from the 
banking sector, either via bank loans or via bank holdings of the bonds they issue. 
The higher the cost of borrowing, the greater will be the cost of money holdings. 
Thus, the nbps’ demand for money will depend inversely both on the interest rate on 
loans and bonds. Finally, as usual, money demand depends positively on income due 
to the transactions motive: 
Md = Md Y,i,ρ ()     (10) 
with  My
d > 0,  Mi
d > 0 and  Mρ
d > 0. 
 
Goods market 
Aggregate demand equals investment demand, and given the assumption of a 
horizontal aggregate supply curve, the nbps' demand for goods determines goods 
market equilibrium. The investment demand function (6) implies that aggregate 
income depends negatively both on the interest rate on loans and on the interest rate 
on bonds: 
Y = Iy , i , ρ ()          ( 1 1 )    7 
with  Iy > 0, Ii < 0 and  Iρ < 0. 
 
Bond (Equity) residual market 
By Walras' law equilibrium in the bond market is derived, residually, from the 
equilibrium of the other equations in the model. 
3. Comparative statics results of a monetary policy 
shock 
The general equilibrium of the model is solved for the seven endogenous 
variables  Y,i,ρ,α,k ,Id,IN ( ) by imposing output, money and credit market 
equilibrium together with the condition that the banks’ balance-sheets constraint is 
satisfied. Total differentiation of the equilibrium condition for the goods, money and 
credit markets gives the following system: 

















































∂R []    (12) 
Let's look at the comparative static results of a monetary policy shock. An 
expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy will increase (decrease) the level of 
income, that is ∂Y
∂R > 0  ∂Y
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The transmission mechanism underlying this comparative static result works as 
follows: the increase (decrease) in reserves let the banking sector increase (decrease) 
both the supply of loans and the demand of bonds. Both interest rates will fall (rise) 
as a consequence of the increased (reduced) banks’ demand for bonds and supply of 
loans. This, in turn, stimulates, through the investment function, an increase 
(decrease) in the equilibrium level of income which restore, through the fall in the 
bank and bond rate, the equilibrium in the money market. Under the conventional 
augmented IS/LM model (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988, Dale and Haldane, 1993a) 
the expansionary (contractionary) impact of monetary policy will be partially offset   8 
by the increased (reduced) nbps’ demand for loans following the increased (reduced) 
level of income. As a consequence, these second round effects lowers the impact of a 
monetary policy shock on income through the fall in the bank loan rate. 
From the augmented IS/LM model with internal funds presented in the previous 
section we know that, as the increase in investment demand following an increase in 
income will give no more place to a one to one increase in the demand for external 
funds as part of the new investments will be financed by internally generated funds, 
the magnitude of  Ly
d will be lower than that of the conventional augmented IS/LM 
model. Thus, when we include the possibility of using internally generated funds in 
financing investments, the offsetting second round effects lowering monetary policy 
effectiveness will be tempered by the limited reduction of the bank loan rate due to 
the reduced magnitude of  Ly
d. The way  Ly
d affects bank loan rate may be determined 
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Equation (14) shows that, as pointed out in Bagliano and Favero (1994), a small 
effect of aggregate demand on the demand for banks’ loans is required even in order 
to have the bank loan rate moving in the opposite direction as the change in 
reserves.3 And given that the inclusion of internally generated funds reduces the 
magnitude of  Ly
d, the final change in the bank loan rate will be higher the lower will 
be the magnitude of  Ly
d. In this way, monetary policy effectiveness will be higher in 
the augmented IS/LM model with internal funds with respect to the standard 
augment IS/LM model.  
“Credit view” explanations of the magnitude of the economy’s response to 
monetary policy shocks stress the effects of a policy change on the external finance 
premium through the balance sheet and the bank lending channels (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). According to the “credit view”, the balance sheet channel stresses the 
additional effects of monetary policy changes on interest rates through the changes in 
borrowers’ balance sheets variables like net worth, cash flow and liquid asset, 
affecting the size of the external finance premium. On the contrary, in our model the 
balance sheet channel represents an enhancement mechanism which amplify interest 
rates effects affecting the quantity rather than the cost of borrowing. Indeed, the 
                                                            
3 A sufficiently small elasticities  of  loan demand to the level of goods demand is even 
necessary in the model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) in order to have the interest  
rates moving in the same direction after a monetary policy impulse.   9 
effects on the interest rates go from quantities to prices and not vice versa. Changes 
in borrowers’ net worth determined from the first round effects of an expansionary 
(contractionary) monetary policy, reduce (increase) the need for external finance and 
the second round effects on the cost of external finance. We may interpret this higher 
monetary policy effectiveness as the result of the reduction of the financial 
constraints on firms’ investment behaviour, being liquidity constraints linked to the 
availability of internally generated funds. Thus, changes in borrowers’ net worth 
over the cycle can amplify and propagate fluctuations in output, a business cycle 
propagation mechanism referred as the “financial accelerator” (Gertler, 1994). These 
sort of results resembles the ones of those macroeconomic models of the New 
Keynesian Economics which highlight the role of internal funds for the level of 
economic activity. Indeed, both Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1990) present models where an accelerator effect emerges as firms’ 
financial conditions over the cycle contribute to amplify output fluctuations. 
4. Evidence from Vector AutoRegression 
In this section we try to verify the interpretation suggested in the previous section 
about the way the balance sheet channel may works inside the monetary transmission 
mechanism examining the effects of monetary policy. Given the lack of consensus 
about a complete structural model of the economy, has become common practice to 
analyze the effects of monetary policy using Vector AutoRegressions (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992, Sims, 1992, Dale and Haldane, 1993b, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993, 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, Christiano et al. 1996, and Bagliano and Favero, 1994). 
Indeed, as the Vector AutoRegressions (VARs) is a system of linear equations, one 
for each variable, where each endogenous variable in the system is a function of all 
of the endogenous variables in the system, it avoids the problem of specifying a 
complete structural model of the economy. Moreover, once estimated, it may 
represents a convenient way to simulate the dynamic effects of monetary policy 
actions on the behaviuor of the economy. 
 
Testing for cointegration 
In order to provide some econometric evidence on the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy we estimate a VAR model which, following the specification of the 
theoretical model of the previous section, includes a monetary policy instrument (the 
monetary base), financial variables (bank loans and the interest rate on bank loans), 
and a final policy objective (the index of industrial production). The sources of the 
data set are the Bank of Italy’s Economic Bullettin for total monetary base, total 
bank loans and the average interest rate on bank loans, and the Istat’s Monthly   10 
Bulletin of Statistics for the seasonally adjusted index of industrial production (base 
year=1990). All variable but the interest rate on loans are expressed in logharitms, 
and both total monetary base and total bank loans are expressed in real terms after 
deflation by the consumers' price index. The data are taken at a monthly frequence 
over the period 1993:2-2001:3. Earlier observations are excluded because of the 
high instability characterizing the last quarter of 1992 which culminated in the exit of 
Italy from the EMS. 
Preliminary application of unit root tests to the four variables included in the VAR 
shows that each variable appears to be non-stationary. With four non-stationary 
variables there may be from zero to three (long-run equilibrium) cointegrating 
relationships among them. In order to test for the existence of cointegrated vectors 
among the included variables we apply the methodology developed by Johansen 
(1988, 1996) which tests the restrictions imposed by cointegration on the 
unresctricted VAR expressed in the following form:4 
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆yt = c + µDUt + Γ Γ Γ Γ i
i=1
3
∑ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆yt−1+ Π Π Π Πyt−2 +εt     (16) 
where DUt is a step-dummy variable5 and Π=αβ’ is a 4x4 matrix with α and β being 
two 4xr matrices of the speed of adjustment and cointegrating parameters, 
respectively. The number of cointegrating relations (i.e. the cointegrating rank, r) is 
obtained estimating the matrix Π in an unrestricted form, and then testing 
sequentially from r=0 to r=3 until we fail to reject the restrictions implied by the 
reduced rank of Π.  
Table 2 - Cointegration-rank test 
  Trace  Johansen 5%  Inoue 5%  Hypothesized 
Eigenvalue  statistics  asymptotic c.v.  asymptotic c.v.  No. of CE(s) 
 0.536970   122.1856   62.61   65.69        None * 
 0.230740   46.72907   42.20   44.52     At most 1 * 
 0.157134   21.02116   25.47   26.98     At most 2 
 0.042620   4.268377    12.39    9.53     At most 3 
                                                            
4 The optimal lag lenght of the VAR was derived using a sequence of (likelihood ratio) 
exclusions tests. 
5 The  introduction of a step-dummy variable from 1998 on is required to have well-behaved 
residuals as the real monetary base series has a level shift after the decisions of the Bank 
of Italy to reduce for three times in the same year both the minimum legal reserve 
requirements and its remuneration.   11 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% significance level (the asymptotic critical 
values allowing for a model like (16) are reported in Johansen, 1996, table 15.4, and Inoue, 
1999, table 1). 
The results of the Johansen cointegration trace test procedure assuming for an 
intercept term in the cointegrating equations and no linear trend in the non-stationary 
part of the process are reported in table 2. They show that both the hypothesis of the 
existence of at most one cointegrating vector is rejected by the data, whilst that of at 
most two cointegrating vectors cannot be rejected by the data. Thus, the matrix Π is 
of rank 2 (the cointegrating rank), as 2 is the number of cointegrating relations. 
Thus, we estimate a three lags Vector Error Correction (VEC) model which includes, 
following the results of the cointegration rank test, two cointegrating equations. 
From the estimated VEC model we calculate the implied impulse response functions 
to a shock to the monetary indicator. As our primary interest is in analysing the 
behaviour of the economy after a monetary policy shock, we do not report the results 
of the VEC coefficient estimates and analyse the estimated dynamic response of the 
other variables with respect to an innovation in the monetary base equation residual. 
 
Impulse response analysis 
VAR analysis of the effects of monetary policy, carried on through the impulse 
response function, requires the choice of an identification scheme in order that each 
reduced-form disturbance be uniquely associated with a structural disturbance. We 
adopt the most common type of identification scheme used in the monetary VARs, 
the Choleski decomposition, which implies a contemporaneous, recursive form on 
the system and is consistent with a Wold causal ordering. 
Following the specification of the theoretical model of the previous section, the 
monetary transmission mechanism within our system is defined over a monetary 
policy instrument (monetary base), financial variables (bank loans and the interest 
rate on bank loans), and a final policy objective (the index of industrial production). 
In this way, the ordering of the variables in the VAR system will be the following: 
monetary base, bank loans, interest rate on bank loans and output. The placement of 
real monetary base at the top of a recursively ordered system requires satisfaction of 
the weak exogeneity assumption of the monetary policy actions. A crucial element to 
consider VAR monetary base equation residuals as representative of a monetary 
policy shock is the assumption that endogenous monetary policy actions may be 
distinguished from exogenous ones, as the first should be representative of the 
monetary authority's reaction function while the latter should consist of all other 
actions (Rudebush, 1998). The weak exogeneity assumption should be satisfied with 
monthly data as policy actions within the month should not be affected by the 
realised values of non-policy variables for that month.   12 
Figure 2 displays the response functions of each of the four variables (real monetary 
base, real bank loans, interest rate on bank loans and output) with respect to an 
innovation in the real monetary base residual. The qualitative patterns exhibited by 
the impulse response functions exhibited of the four variables of the system accords 
with the interpretation of the monetary transmission mechanism proposed in section 
3. Indeed, following a monetary easing bank loans raise almost immediately (the first 
peak after about three months) while, correspondingly, the interest rate on bank loans 
begins to fall (reaching its minimum after about eight periods). The fall of the 
interest rate on bank loans stimulates output which after about eight months from the 
monetary policy shock begins to rise. In the medium run (12-24 months) the 
monetary policy shock seems to have a permanent effect on output, bank loans tends 
to return slowly to their original values and the interest rate on bank loans shows no 
tendency to return to its initial value (an effect which may be explained by the 
indirect effect of the balance sheet channel on the cost of borrowing). These 
medium run patterns of the financial variables is just what we should expect when a 
''financial accelerator'' mechanism is at work. Indeed, with informational problems in 
external capital markets determining firms' financial constraints, the increased 
availability of internally generated funds will induce firms to substitute the source of 
funds, bank loans, with the lower one, internal funds. 
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Conclusions 
 
The link between borrowers’ balance sheet position and investments may help 
explaining empirical findings6 about monetary policy ability to affect real output, at 
least in the short run, through the balance sheet (net worth) channel. According to 
the “credit view” monetary policy actions may affect the wedge between the cost of 
funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of internal funds, that is the external 
finance premium, through its influence on borrowers’ financial position. 
When including firms’ internal funds as a source of financing new investments in 
an augmented IS/LM model, monetary policy may become more powerful since it 
operates directly through its influence on firms’ financial constraints. In particular, 
the economy’s response to monetary policy shocks is magnified by a balance sheet 
channel  which affects firms’ investment spending decisions through the quantity 
rather than the cost of borrowing. Thus, changes in borrowers’ net worth over the 
cycle can amplify and propagate output fluctuations directly rather than indirectly as 
in the traditional interpretation of the balance sheet channel.  
The empirical analysis of the moneatry transmission mechanism for Italy in the 
last decade accords with the interpretation of the balance sheet channel proposed in 
this paper as an enhancement mechanism amplifying the effects of monetary policy 
actions through the quantity rather than the cost of borrowing. 
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